gulf of tonkin conspiracy gulf of tonkin conspiracy

You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. Vietnam is a very watery country. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. Gulf of Tonkin - National Security Agency Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Fluoride. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. The NSA report is revealing. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. 14. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. Naval Institute. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube 8. 3. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). 12. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). "The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. . The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. With that false foundation in their minds, the on-scene naval analysts saw the evidence around them as confirmation of the attack they had been warned about. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet 15. Hickman, Kennedy. 11. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The Dollar Bill . In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. 14. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." He spoke out against banning girls education. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". When Did the U.S. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. 1, p. 646. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. ." But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. 302-303. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. . Hickman, Kennedy. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. The Navys seaborne SIGINT effort in support of OPLAN-34, called Desoto Missions, played a key role in the events that ultimately led to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). The Health Conspiracy. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. He also requested air support. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). 4. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. Operation Fast and Furious 10 On 6 August, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox was ". It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. ThoughtCo. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. 9. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests."